UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

6-25-2012

State v. Wolfe Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38896

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Wolfe Respondent's Brief Dckt. 38896" (2012). Not Reported. 367.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/367

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAH
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
WILLIAM FRANKLIN WOLFE,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

OPY

NO. 38896

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF IDAHO

HONORABLE MICHAEL J. GRIFFIN
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4
I.

II.

This Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction To Review
The District Court's Order Entered In 2006 ............................... .4
A.

lntroduction ...................................................................... 4

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 4

C.

Because Wolfe Did Not Timely Appeal From
The Order Denying His Claim Of Lack Of
Jurisdiction, This Court Lacks Appellate
Jurisdiction To Review That Order .................................. 5

Even If The Merits Of Wolfe's Arguments Are Reached,
He Has Failed To Show Error .................................................... 7
A.

Introduction ...................................................................... 7

B.

Standard Of Review ........................................................ 7

C.

Because Wolfe's Jurisdictional Claim Was
Decided In 2006, Re-litigation Of That Claim
Is Barred By Res Judicata ............................................... 7

D.

Even If Wolfe Could Challenge The District
Court's 2006 Ruling, He Has Failed To Show Error ...... 10

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 13
APPENDIX

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Baird Oil Company, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 144 Idaho 229,
159 P.3d 866 (2007) .................................................................... 7, 8
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 623,
238 P.3d 223 (2010) ...................................................................... 10
Crown v. Klein Bros., 121 Idaho 942,829 P.2d 532 (Ct. App. 1991) .................... 8
Diamond v. Farmers Group. Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990) ............... 8
H & V Engineering. Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of Professional Engineers
and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646,747 P.2d 55 (1987) ............... 4
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 57 P.3d 803 (2002) .................................... 8, 9
Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549,208 P. 241 (1922) ............. 9
Kansas City v. Garner, 430 S.W. 2d 630 (Mo. App. 1968) .................................. 11
Kootenai Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116,
219 P.3d 440 (2009) ....................................................................... 9
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 78 P.3d 379 (2003) ...................................... 7, 9
Statev. Clements, 148 Idaho 82,218 P.3d 1143 (2009) .............................. 11, 12
Statev. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891,665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983) .............................. 5
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003) ......................................... 11
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 80 P.3d 1083 (2003) ...................................... .4
Statev. Lute, 150 Idaho 837,252 P.3d 1255 (2011) .......................................... 11
State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996) ............................... 5
State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 11 P.3d 481 (2000) ................................. 7, 8, 9
State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 655 P.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1982) .............................. 5

ii

State v. Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165 (Az. App. 1995) .............................................. 11
State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 691 P.2d 1291 (Ct. App. 1984) ...................... 1, 11
TicorTitle Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,157 P.3d 613 (2007) ........................... 9
Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 621,238 P.3d 221 (2010) .......... 10
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,
207 P .3d 1008 (2009) ...................................................................... 9
Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996) .............. 1O
Wolfe v. State, 117 Idaho 645, 791 P .2d 26 (Ct. App. 1990) ................................ 1

RULES

I.A.R. 14 ................................................................................................................ 5

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William Franklin Wolfe appeals from the district court's order denying him
a hearing on a previously decided Rule 35 motion.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Almost three decades ago Wolfe was convicted for first-degree murder
and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 691
P.2d 1291 (Ct. App. 1984).

His first and second petitions for post-conviction

relief were denied and the denials were affirmed on appeal. Wolfe v. State, 117
Idaho 645, 791 P.2d 26 (Ct. App. 1990).
About fifteen years after his initial post-conviction petitions were denied,
Wolfe filed, in the criminal case, a "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief' asserting
lack of jurisdiction based on a claim of superseding federal Indian jurisdiction.
(R., vol. I, pp. 3-8, 63-68.) He also asserted the same claim in a Rule 35 motion.
(R., vol. I, pp. 31-32; see also R., vol. I, pp. 9, 49-50.)

Shortly thereafter the

district court entered an order concluding that the claim of Indian jurisdiction was
potentially meritorious and requiring additional briefing on the question of
whether the Idaho court had jurisdiction. (R., vol. I, pp. 9-16, 85-92, 95-102.)
The district court also ordered that the post-conviction petition be filed in a civil
case, and it was assigned Case No. CV 05-36455. (R., vol. I, pp. 17, 105.) The
district court ultimately rejected Wolfe's claim of superseding federal Indian
jurisdiction in a memorandum Decision and Order entered on October 26, 2006.
(R., vol. 11, pp. 375-95.)

1

Several years later Wolfe moved in the criminal case for a hearing on his
already denied Rule 35 motion. (R., vol. II, pp. 289-97.) The court denied the
motion for a hearing on the basis that it had, after a hearing, decided the
jurisdictional claim raised by Wolfe in the post-conviction action "in its
Memorandum Opinion of October 26, 2006" and its "Order of December 21,
2006" and therefore there was no need for a hearing in the criminal case. 1 (R.,
vol. II, pp. 298-99; see also R., vol. II, pp. 375-95.) Wolfe timely appealed from
the order denying his request for a hearing. (R., vol. II, pp. 300-01 .)
A few days after he filed his notice of appeal Wolfe filed another Rule 35
motion again asserting that the court lacked jurisdiction because of superseding
federal Indian jurisdiction.

(R., vol. II, pp. 328-64.) The district court likewise

denied this motion. (R., vol. II, p. 365.)

1

The state also requests this Court to take judicial notice that the United States
District Court for the District of Idaho rejected Wolfe's petition for writ of habeas
corpus claiming exclusive federal jurisdiction because his petition was not filed
within the applicable statute of limitation and that the district court's decision was
affirmed on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Copies of the relevant
orders are attached to this brief as an Appendix.
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ISSUES

Wolfe states the issues on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wolfe's motion
for reconsideration of his Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal
sentence, and when the district court denied Mr. Wolfe's
subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging an illegal sentence?
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

On this appeal Wolfe challenges a ruling made by the district court in 2006
which was not timely appealed. Does this Court lack jurisdiction to
consider the only issue raised by Wolfe on appeal?

2.

Even if this Court has jurisdiction, has Wolfe failed to show that his claim
is not barred by principles of res judicata?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
This Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction To Review The District Court's Order
Entered In 2006
A.

Introduction
On appeal Wolfe "asserts that the district court erred both in denying his

motion for reconsideration of the denial of his initial Rule 35 motion alleging an
illegal sentence due to the absence of subject matter jurisdiction and in denying
his subsequent Rule 35 motion alleging the same."

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)

Because the district court decided this issue no later than 2006, the June 9, 2011
notice of appeal does not confer on this Court appellate jurisdiction to address
the merits of the issue raised.

B.

Standard Of Review
"'A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate courts'] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal."' State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)).

Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free

review. Kavaiecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.
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C.

Because Wolfe Did Not Timely Appeal From The Order Denying His Claim
Of Lack Of Jurisdiction, This Court Lacks Appellate Jurisdiction To Review
That Order
An appeal must be filed within 42 days of the order appealed from. I.AR.

14(a). A timely filed notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.
State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996); State v.
Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1983). Any appeal taken after the
expiration of the 42-day filing period must be dismissed. State v. Tucker, 103
Idaho 885, 888, 655 P.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 1982). The time for an appeal in a
criminal case is tolled during the pendency of a timely motion for reconsideration.
See I.AR. 14.
Wolfe raised his claim of superseding federal jurisdiction for the first time
in a Rule 35 motion filed on December 2, 2004.

(R., vol. I, pp. 31-46.) The

district court denied that motion (R., vol. I, p. 49), but Wolfe asked for
reconsideration within 14 days (R., vol. I, pp. 50-55). Wolfe also raised the claim
in a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., vol. I, pp. 3-8, 63-68.) After finding
potential merit in the jurisdictional claim (R., vol. I, pp. 9-16), the district court
transferred both the motion and the petition to a civil case for post-conviction
relief (R., vol. I, p. 17). The court then decided the matter against Wolfe in a
Memorandum Decision and Order filed October 26, 2006. (R., vol. I, pp. 375-94.)
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Wolfe, in April 2011, filed a motion requesting a hearing on the "Rule 35
Motion to Reconsider" in the criminal case. 2 (R., vol. 11, p. 289.) The district court
denied Wolfe's "request for a hearing on his Motion for relief pursuant to ICR 35
that he filed in December 2004" on the ground that "he has already had a hearing
on that Motion and it was Denied." (R., vol. II, p. 299 (capitalization original).)
Wolfe's notice of appeal (R., vol. II, p. 300) is timely only from the order denying
him a hearing and is not timely from the 2006 order denying, his requested relief.
Asking for a hearing on a motion denied years before did not re-start the appeal
clock and appealing from the order denying that hearing does not confer on this
Court appellate jurisdiction to consider a challenge to the 2006 order.
Several days after filing his notice of appeal from the denial of a motion for
a hearing on a previously denied motion, Wolfe filed another Rule 35 motion
raising the same issue as before.
again denied this motion.

(R., vol. 11, pp. 328-64.)

(R., vol. II, p. 365.)

The district court

'

This motion, effectively for

reconsideration, did not renew the expired appeal period any more than the
motion for a hearing did.
The order Wolfe seeks to challenge on this appeal was entered in 2006,
more than four years before he filed his notice of appeal. This Court therefore
lacks jurisdiction to consider the issue Wolfe attempts to raise on appeal.

2

It is probably not coincidence that Wolfe filed this motion relatively shortly after
the federal district court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Compare
Appendix (denial of habeas corpus signed March 11, 2011) with R., vol. 11, p. 289
(motion for hearing filed April 25, 2011 ).)
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11.
Even If The Merits Of Wolfe's Arguments Are Reached, He Has Failed To Show
Error

A.

Introduction
Wolfe argues that the district court's 2006 ruling on his claim of

superseding federal jurisdiction is not binding and that this Court, on appeal,
should find the facts underlying that claim.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-22.) This

argument is without merit. Specifically, the district court's prior ruling on Wolfe's
jurisdictional claim is entitled to preclusive effect under the doctrine of res

judicata, and Wolfe's argument that he can endlessly and repeatedly litigate that
question is legally unsound.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether an action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata

is a question of law over which an appellate court exercises free review. Baird
Oil Company, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com'n, 144 Idaho 229, 231, 159 P.3d 866,
868 (2007) (citing Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 320, 78 P.3d 379, 387
(2003); State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000).

C.

Because Wolfe's Jurisdictional Claim Was Decided In 2006, Re-litigation
Of That Claim Is Barred By Res Judicata
The district court did not deny Wolfe's motion for a hearing on the basis of

res judicata, but instead on the basis that the motion for which he wanted a
hearing had already been denied. (R., vol. II, pp. 298-99.) Wolfe's claim that this
denial was premised upon a finding of res judicata is a misreading of the order.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) As set forth above, the district court did not decide
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any order subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of res
judicata. However, res judicata would have been a valid ground for denying any

claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction because of superseding federal
Indian jurisdiction asserted after the 2006 decision by the district court denying
post-conviction relief and the Rule 35 motion.
The doctrine of res judicata prevents re-litigation of issues that have been
previously decided in a final judgment or decision in an action between the same
litigants. State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481, 482 (2000). As
succinctly explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Res judicata is comprised of claim preclusion (true res judicata) and
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Under the principles of claim
preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action
between the same parties upon the same claim.

Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002), quoted in Baird
Oil Company, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 144 Idaho 229, 231, 159 P.3d
866, 868 (2007).
For purposes of res judicata, the term "same claim" is not theory or
argument based. Rather, the term is transactional:
The "sameness" of a cause of action for purposes of application of
the doctrine of res judicata is determined by examining the
operative facts underlying the two law suits [sic]. [Citation omitted.]

[A] valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes all
claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions
out of which the cause of action arose.
Crown v. Klein Bros., 121 Idaho 942, 946, 829 P.2d 532, 536 (Ct. App. 1991)
(quoting Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149-150, 804 P.2d
8

319, 322-323 (1990)) (brackets and ellipsis in original). Indeed, the term "same
claim" could be substituted with the phrase "same demand." Joyce v. Murphy
Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241, 242-43 (1922).

The

preclusive effect of res judicata thus extends to bar "not only subsequent
relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any
claims relating to the same cause of action which were actually made or which
might have been made" in the first suit. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at
805, quoted in Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 320, 78 P.3d 379, 387 (2003).
Accord, M.:., Kootenai Electric Cooperative. Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116,
_ , 219 P.3d 440, 444 (2009); Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401,
147 Idaho 277, 288, 207 P.3d 1008, 1019 (2009); Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144
Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 613,620 (2007); Rhoades, 134 Idaho at 863, 11 P.3d
at 482.
Here, Wolfe asserted a claim of superseding federal Indian jurisdiction in
his renewed motion for reconsideration and in his petition for post-conviction
relief.

That claim was litigated to and rejected by the district court in 2006. 3

Because the district court rejected the claim of superseding federal Indian
jurisdiction in 2006, such was not subject to re-adjudication in 2011. Res judicata
barred Wolfe from relitigating his claim of superseding federal Indian jurisdiction.
Wolfe contends that questions of jurisdiction are never subject to res
judicata, so that, at least in theory, a party may litigate jurisdictional questions as

3

The state also notes that the same claim was rejected on essentially the same
basis in the federal courts as well. (Appendix.)
9

often as he wishes. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) This argument stems from a
misunderstanding of the principles of res judicata.

Although it is true that an

order entered without jurisdiction is not binding on the parties, Wolfe v. Farm
Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 403, 913 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996), here it is
clear, and indeed undisputed, that the district court had jurisdiction to rule on the
scope of its own jurisdiction. See Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 149
Idaho 623, 224-25, 238 P.3d 223, 224-25 (2010) (court can rule on its own
jurisdiction); Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 149 Idaho 621, 622-23, 238 P.3d
221, 222-23 (2010) (same).

Because resolution of jurisdictional claims is

necessarily within a court's jurisdiction, the trial court's ruling on Wolfe's
jurisdictional claim was within its jurisdiction and therefore subject to principles of
res judicata.

Wolfe's claim that he can, effectively, eternally litigate his

jurisdictional claim is without merit.

D.

Even If Wolfe Could Challenge The District Court's 2006 Ruling, He Has
Failed To Show Error
Ultimately Wolfe asks this Court to reverse the district court's 2006 ruling

that his jurisdictional claim was barred as untimely and then enter its own factual
findings on the claim without giving the state a chance to respond with evidence.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-23.) As set forth above, this Court lacks jurisdiction to
review the district court's 2006 ruling.

Even if this Court had appellate

jurisdiction, the district court's ruling was entitled to res judicata effect, preventing
Wolfe from relitigating his claim. Finally, even if this Court had jurisdiction and res
judicata was not binding, Wolfe has failed to show error.

10

"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the
judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714
(2003). Although Rule 35 allows a challenge to the legality of the sentence "at
any time," it confers upon the court jurisdiction only to review the existing record,
and does not confer jurisdiction to engage in new fact-finding. State v. Clements,
148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009).
In this case the judgment became final almost thirty years ago. State v.
Wolfe, 107 Idaho 676, 691 P.2d 1291 (Ct. App. 1984). Wolfe's claim is premised
upon him proving by a preponderance of evidence that his victim was "Indian"
and that the murder happened in "Indian Country" as those terms are defined in
federal law. State v. Verdugo, 901 P.2d 1165, 1167-69 (Az. App. 1995). "Unless
timely raised and proved," a claim of superseding federal jurisdiction is
"unavailing."

Kansas City v. Garner, 430 S.W. 2d 630, 635 (Mo. App. 1968)

(quoted in Verdugo, 901 P.2d at 1167-69).
As pointed out by Wolfe, a court may consider challenges to its jurisdiction
"'where a court properly has jurisdiction to consider a case [under Rule 35]."'
(Appellant's brief, p. 14 (quoting State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d
1255, 1258 (2011)). However, even jurisdictional challenges to a final judgment
may be made only if there is '"a statute or rule extending [the court's]
jurisdiction."' Lute, 150 Idaho at 840, 252 P.3d at 1258 (quoting Jakoski, 139
Idaho at 355, 79 P.3d at 714). Here there is no such statute or rule granting

11

jurisdiction to consider Wolfe's claim attacking his final judgment. Rule 35 did not
grant the district court jurisdiction to make the factual determinations underlying
Wolfe's jurisdictional claim. Clements, 148 Idaho at 84, 218 P.3d at 1145. Wolfe
has failed to cite to any other statute or rule that extended the district court's
jurisdiction to make the factual findings upon which his claim was based. (See
generally Appellant's brief.} Wolfe has failed to show error in the district court's
determination that Wolfe's failure to timely assert his claim of superseding federal
Indian jurisdiction was fatal to that claim.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying Wolfe a hearing on the Rule 35 motion it had denied years earlier.

DATED this 25th day of June, 2012.

KENNETH K. JORGE SE
Deputy Attorney Gene I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of June 2012, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KKJ/pm
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

WILLIAM WOLFE,
Case No. 1:09-CV-00533-REB
Petitioner,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER

V.

JOHANNA SMITH, Warden,
Respondent.

Currently pending in this habeas corpus matter is Respondent's Motion for
Summary Dismissal. (Dkt. 17.) The parties have consented to a United States Magistrate
Judge conducting all proceedings, including entering final judgment, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (Dkt. 12.)
The parties have adequately stated the facts and the law in their briefing, and the
Court will resolve the pending Motion on the parties' briefing and the written record
without oral argument. D. Idaho L. Civ. R. 7.l(d)(l). For the reasons that follow, the
Court finds the Petition to be untimely, and Respondent's Motion will be granted.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - I
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BACKGROUND
After a jury trial in 1982, Petitioner was convicted of one count of murder in the
first degree for shooting Scott Gold to death outside a bar in Stites, Idaho, and the state
court sentenced him to fixed life in prison. (State' Lodging A-1, pp. 112-14.) Petitioner
appealed his conviction and sentence, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. (State's
Lodging B-4.) He did not seek review in the Idaho Supreme Court, and the remittitur was
issued on December 24, 1984. (State's Lodging B-5.) Petitioner next pursued postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and other claims, but all
relief was denied. (State's Lodgings G-5, G-7, G-8.) Petitioner completed his initial round
of post-conviction proceedings in 1990. (State's Lodging G-8.)
Petitioner had nothing pending in any court for the next fourteen years, until he
filed a "Motion for Rule 35 Relief from an Illegal Sentence" on December 2, 2004.
(State's Lodging H-1.) In that motion, Petitioner alleged for the first time in court that
Scott Gold was of Native American descent and that the offense occurred on the Nez
Perce Indian Reservation, which Petitioner contended meant that "the subject matter of the
homicide in question is and at all times has been solely within the exclusive federal
authority.'' (State's Lodging H-1, p. 2.) According to Petitioner, the state court lacked
jurisdiction to convict him of murder, and his sentence for that crime was therefore
"illegal." (State's Lodging H-2, p. 11.)
The state district court summarily dismissed the motion as untimely. (State's
Lodging H-3.) Rather than appeal from that order, Petitioner filed a "Motion to Reconsider
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2
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For [sic] I.R.C.P. 60(b) Relief." (State's Lodging M-2, p. 28.) Before the court ruled on the
request for reconsideration, Petitioner filed a new petition for post-conviction relief, his
third, on February 11, 2005. 1 (State's Lodging 1-1.) In this latest pleading, Petitioner
alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not pressing the jurisdictional issue during
the original criminal proceedings in the 1980s. (State's Lodging 1-1, pp. 1-6.) Petitioner
also raised the substantive jurisdictional issue again in other simultaneous filings, which
the court ordered to be docketed as part of the post-conviction matter. (State's Lodging J12, Appendix G.)
The district court issued a preliminary decision indicating that Petitioner's
jurisdictional argument may have merit, but because "[s]etting aside a conviction for firstdegree murder is serious business and should not be undertaken lightly," it ordered the
State and the Nez Perce tribe to file briefs addressing the issue. (State's Lodging 1-2, pp.
5-6.) The court also appointed counsel for Petitioner. (State's Lodging J-12, Appendix A,
p. 2.) The Nez Perce tribe did not respond to the court's order, but the State objected on
numerous grounds. (State's Lodgings 1-3, 1-7, I-8.)
To that point, Petitioner had offered no proof to support his claim that Gold was a
member of an Indian tribe, but documents were eventually discovered in June 2006
apparently showing that Gold was an enrolled member of Blackfeet Indian Nation in
Montana and that Stites, Idaho, sits within the boundary of the Nez Perce Indian

1

In fact, the parties agree that the state district court has never expressly ruled on Petitioner's
motion to reconsider the denial of his Rule 35 motion.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 3

Case 1:09-cv-00533-REB Document 35

Filed 03/ 11 / 11

Page 4 of 17

Reservation. (State's Lodging I-16, Exhibit C.) After considering the parties' briefing and
hearing oral argument, however, the district court found the third post-conviction petition
to be tmtimely under Idaho Code§ 19-4902. (State's Lodging I-20, pp. 19-20.) The court
further concluded that if it construed the pleading as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
it would lack jurisdiction because a habeas petition must be filed in the county in which
the petitioner is held. (State's Lodging I-20, p. 20.) On January 4, 2007, the court entered
an order of dismissal, (State's Lodging J-12, pp. 6-7), and Petitioner did not appeal.
Three months later, on April 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus in Ada County, again raising the jurisdictional argument, which was dismissed on
procedural grounds on December 2, 2008. (State's Lodging J-1, J-2, J-3; State's Lodging
J-13, pp. 3-7 .) Petitioner submitted an tmtimely notice of appeal, and the Idaho Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal. (State's Lodging K-5.) Petitioner next filed a "Petition for
Writ of Certiorari/Writ of Review'' in the Idaho Supreme Court, raising essentially the
same argument, which was denied on June 8, 2009. (State's Lodging L-1, L-2.)
On October 21, 2009, Petitioner initiated these federal habeas proceedings, alleging
that (1) he has been deprived of his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment because "the trial court lacked jurisdiction in which to try, convict and
sentence the Petitioner for an alleged murder occurring on Indian lands," and (2) his right
to due process was violated when the state court "failed to decide the jurisdiction issue on
the merits of the claim." (Dkt. I, pp. 10-13.) This Court appointed counsel to assist
Petitioner, and it ordered the Petition to be served on Respondent. (Dk:t. 5, p. 4.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4
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Respondent responded to the Petition by filing the pending Motion for Summary
Dismissal, in which Respondent contends that the applicable statute of limitations expired
long before the Petitioner came to federal court. (Dkt. 17-1, pp. 12-16.) Respondent also
argues that Petitioner has not fairly presented the same constitutional claims to the Idaho
Supreme Court in a procedurally proper manner, and his claims must be dismissed as
procedurally defaulted. (Dkt. 17-1, pp. 16-23.) Petitioner has filed a response (Dkt. 29), to
which Respondent has replied (Dkt. 33), and the Motion is now at issue.
Because the Court concludes that the Petition is untimely, it will not reach
Respondent's procedural default argument.

STANDARD OF LAW
Habeas petitions filed after the enactment of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d). The one-year period begins to run from the date of one of four triggering events,
as specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A)-(D). The most common event is the date upon
which the judgment became final in state court, either after the direct appeal has concluded
or after the time for seeking an appeal expired. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A). When a
petitioner's state court judgment became final before AEDPA was enacted, as here, the
petitioner generally had a one-year grace period, until April 24, 1997, in which to file his
federal petition. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001).
However, additional statutory subsections provide for a later starting date when any
of the following situations are present: (1) the State has unlawfully created an impediment
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to filing a federal petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(B); (2) the United States Supreme Court
has determined that a new constitutional right is retroactive, 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(l)(C)~ or
(3) the petitioner has discovered new evidence that could not have been obtained
previously through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(D).
To encourage the proper exhaustion of state court remedies, the statute of
limitations is tolled or suspended for all of "[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). This is known as "statutory
tolling."
The period also may be tolled for equitable reasons when extraordinary
circumstances prevented the petitioner from filing on time ("equitable tolling"). Holland v.

Florida, 130 S.Ct 2549, 2560 (2010). A litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden
of establishing that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way. Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (citing Pace v. DeGuglielmo,
544 U.S. 408,418 (2005)).
DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that the state court judgment in this case became final in 1984,
nearly twelve years before AEDPA was enacted. Respondent argues that limitations period
began to run on April 24, 1996, the date that AEDPA became law, and expired one year
later, on April 24, 1997. According to Respondent, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory
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tolling because he had no state post-conviction or other collateral actions pending during
that one year period.

In contrast, Petitioner claims that Respondent is equitably estopped from raising the
statute of limitations as a defense because State officials engaged in misconduct that
prevented him from filing on time, and that.he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute
of limitations on those same grounds. Alternatively, he argues that the Petition is timely
because the starting date of the limitations period was delayed until he uncovered new
evidence of Scott Gold's tribal affiliation in 2006, and that the limitations period was then
statutorily tolled while additional matters were pending in the state courts. Finally, he
contends that even if the Court believes that the action is untimely, his "actual innocence"
provides a reason for the Court to overlook his lack of compliance with the statute of
limitations.
The Court will address each of Petitioner's arguments in turn.

1. Equitable Considerations
Petitioner first claims that Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) officials
"withheld [Petitioner's] legal material from him until after the statute of limitations had
run [and] it informed him - three times - that the statute of limitations had expired,"
(Dkt. 29, p. 2.)
More specifically, Petitioner alleges that in 1995 or 1996 he gave his legal material
to another inmate, Bob Jones, who was then working as a law clerk for IDOC, so that
Jones could prepare a federal petition on his behalf, (Affidavit of William Wolfe, Dkt. 29MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7
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1, ,r 4.) In January of 1996, Petitioner was transferred to an out-of-state prison, but his
legal file stayed behind. (Wolfe Aff., ,r 6.) Jones has since executed an affidavit in which
he claims that IDOC officials confiscated all of his legal work in 1996, including
Petitioner's file, and retained them during the one-year grace period that Petitioner had for
filing a habeas petition in federal court. (Affidavit of Bob Jones, Dkt. 29-3, ,r,r 11-12.)

In May of 1997, Jones wrote a letter to Petitioner and three other inmates to inform
them that the federal statute of limitations had recently expired in their cases. (Jones Aff.,

,r 20.) That same month, an IDOC paralegal sent Petitioner's legal material to him together
with a letter stating that the time to file a habeas petition had expired. (Wolfe Aff., ,r,r 1214.) In February 1998, the paralegal allegedly reiterated to Petitioner that the statute of
limitations had elapsed, and Petitioner believed that he no longer had recourse in the
federal courts. (Wolfe Aff., ,r 20.)
On these facts, Petitioner invokes the doctrine of"equitable estoppel" and contends
that the State's alleged misconduct precludes Respondent from now raising the statute of
limitations as a defense. (Dkt. 29, pp. 1-5.) He further contends that even if Respondent is
not estopped from asserting the defense entirely, the Court should find that the limitations
period was equitably tolled. (Dkt. 29, pp. 8-10.)
Equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are related concepts, but equitable estoppel
focuses on the defendant's affirmative misconduct or fraudulent concealment of the facts,

Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000), while equitable tolling
can be based on any "extraordinary circumstance" that stands in the petitioner's way of
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filing a timely petition, Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). "Both equitable
tolling and equitable estoppel can be used to 'stop a limitations period from continuing to
run after it has already begun to run."' Socop-Gonzalez v. I.NS., 272 F.3d 11761 1184 (9th
Cir. 2001 ). But in either case the limitations period will be suspended or tolled only as
long as the plaintiff was prevented from initiating an action. Stitt v. Williams, 919 F.2d
516, 523 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
Assuming that Petitioner 1 s factual allegations are true, the Court nevertheless
concludes that neither equitable estoppel nor equitable tolling would assist him in excusing
his lengthy delay in getting to federal court. To the extent that State officials engaged in
misconduct, it was limited to the retention of Petitioner's legal files during the running of
the grace period from 1996 to 1997. That barrier was removed by May of 1997 when
Petitioner's files were returned to him, and yet he waited another seven years before he
pursued relief again in any court. The information that Bob Jones and an IDOC paralegal
gave to Petitioner about the expiration of the federal statute of limitations was technically
true, and the fact that they did not inform that he might be able to argue for equitable
tolling does not amount to misconduct or some other extraordinary circumstance.
A party invoking the protection of equity must still act with reasonable diligence,
and Petitioner has not shown that the State's alleged misconduct prevented him from
raising claims for relief between 1997 and late 2004, when he began a new round of
collateral attacks in the state courts. See Balsewicz v. Kingston, 425 F .3d 1029, 1034 (7th
Cir. 2005) (holding that equitable estoppel was not warranted because the petitioner
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 9
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"waited four and a half years before filing any state collateral cha1lenge. "); see also Roy v.
Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006) (to be entitled to equitable tolling, a petitioner
must show that he has been pursuing his rights diligently during the time period that he
seeks to have to1led). Accordingly, these equitable doctrines are not available to Petitioner
as a means of saving an otherwise untimely filing.

2. Delayed Accrual and Statutory Tolling
Petitioner alternatively contends that the limitations period did not even begin to
run until he was able to develop the factual basis of his claim that Gold was a member of
an Indian tribe, which occurred during the third post-conviction action in June of 2006.
(Dkt. 29, p. 5.) In support, he relies on the statutory subsection that governs the accrual
date for claims based on newly discovered evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(D), which
provides that the one-year limitations period begins to run on "the date on which the
factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence."
Respondent counters that even if the limitations period began as late as June 2006,
the period would have only been statutorily tolled until the third post-conviction
proceeding became final on February 15, 2007, and Petitioner's October 2009 Petition
would still be over a year and half out of time. (Dkt. 33, pp. 4-6.) The Court is persuaded
by this argument.
While a state habeas action was also pending in Ada County state district court
between April 2007 and December 2008, that action did not toll the limitations period
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 10
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because it was not "properly filed'' for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Artuz v.

Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 11 (2000), the Supreme Court held that '"an application is 'properly
filed' when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and
rules governing filings." The state court in Ada County dismissed Petitioner's habeas
action after concluding that (1) habeas was not an appropriate vehicle i11 which to
challenge a conviction; (2) if the application were construed as a post-conviction petition,
it was filed in the wrong county; and (3) was barred because the Idaho County district
court had already denied relief. (State's Lodging J-13, pp. 3-7.) Each of these reasons
shows that the state court deemed the action to be improperly filed under applicable state
law.
Petitioner attempts to avoid this result by claiming that the Rule 35 proceeding that
he initiated on December 2, 2004, is still pending-and tolls the limitations period under

§ 2244(d)(2) to this day-because the state district court never ruled on his motion to
reconsider the denial of Rule 35 relief. (Dkt. 29, pp. 6-7.) ContTary to Petitioner's
argument, the district court's order denying reliefin that matter became final when the
time to appeal expired on January 25, 2005.
This conclusion is dictated by Idaho Appellate Rule 14 and case law that has
interpreted it. Rule 14(a) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within forty-two days
from the date that an appealable order, judgment, or decree has been entered. The Rule
also provides for the termination and restarting of the time to appeal when certain postjudgment motions are filed in criminal matters:
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER- 11
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The time for an appeal from any criminal judgment, order or sentence in an
action is terminated by the filing of a motion within fourteen ( 14) days of
the entry of the judgment which, if granted, could affect the judgment, order
or sentence in the action, in which case the appeal period for the judgment
and sentence commences to run upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on
the order deciding such motion.
I.A.R. 14(a).
By the Rule's plain terms, the time to appeal is terminated only by a motion that is
filed in a criminal case within fourteen days of "the entry of judgment," and a motion filed
within fourteen days of an otherwise appealable post-judgment order will not extend the
time to appeal. State v. Yeaton, 829 P.2d 1367 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992). In those
circumstances, "the appeal must be filed within forty-two days of that order," regardless
whether a motion to reconsider has been filed in the interim. See id at 1369; see also State

v. Thomas, 199 P.3d 769, 770 (Idaho 2008) (holding that the filing of a Rule 35 motion
within fourteen days of the entry of an order revoking probation did not stop the time to
appeal from the order revoking probation). Petitioner did not appeal from the district
court's order denying Rule 35 relief, and that order became final under state law on
January 25, 2005.
In addition, while it is true that the state district court did not expressly rule on the
motion to reconsider, Petitioner did not diligently pursue the matter, either. Rather than
pressing the court for a ruling or appealing the court's order denying Rule 35 relief,
Petitioner instead chose to alter his tactics and attack his conviction in a third petition for
post-conviction relief. A fair reading of the record is that the parties then shifted their
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focus to the post-conviction proceeding and deemed the Rule 35 matter to be closed or
replaced by the new action.
For these reasons, Petitioner's motion to reconsider did not prolong the life of the
Rule 35 matter indefinitely.
Therefore, even if the Court were to conclude that the limitations period did not
begin until June of 2006, and that it was tolled until the third post-conviction proceeding
was completed in February 15, 2007, the statute of limitations would have expired, at the
latest, on February 15, 2008. Petitioner's "Petition for Writ of Certiorari/Writ of Review,"
filed in the Idaho Supreme Court in May 2009, could not breathe new life into a
limitations period that had already expired, see Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 822
(9th Cir. 2003), and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus would still be well over a year
out of time.
3. Actual Innocence

For his final argument, Petitioner claims that the Court should overlook any noncompliance with the statute of limitations because the state court lacked jurisdiction to
convict him of murder, which he contends means that he is actually innocent of the crime.
The United States Supreme court has held that a procedural default may be excused
in a federal habeas case if the petitioner can show a fundamental miscarriage of justice,
which means that a non-harmless constitutional error has probably resulted in the
conviction of someone who is innocent. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986).
A claim of actual innocence under these circumstances is not itself a basis for habeas relief
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 13
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but is instead a gateway to the consideration of defaulted constitutional claims. Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995). To pass through this gateway, the petitioner must come

forward with "new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence-that was not presented at
trial." Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315. In Schlup, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner bears
the burden of demonstrating that "in light of all the evidence, including evidence not
introduced at trial, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found
[him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 327. Put another way, the petitioner must
establish that is "more likely than not any reasonable juror would have reasonable doubt."
House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006).

Although it is clear that a compelling claim of actual innocence will save a
procedurally defaulted claim in a timely habeas petition, the Supreme Court has not yet

addressed whether a petitioner's innocence will also provide a reason to toll the running of
AEDPA 's statute of limitations. In Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 2002), the
Ninth Circuit declined to rule on the issue directly and remanded the case to the district
court for its initial assessment of the quality of the petitioner's new evidence under the
Schlup standard. The issue is still unsettled in this Circuit. 2

2

A panel of the Ninth Circuit has recently held that "there is no Schlup actual innocence
exception to override AEDPA's statute of limitations," Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125, 1133 (9th Cir.
2010), but the full Court has granted rehearing en bane, and Lee cannot be cited as precedent. Lee v.
Lampert, 2011 WL 499347 *I (9th Cir. 2011).
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Whatever might be said about whether an actual innocence exception to AEDPA's
statute of limitations exists, the matter is largely academic in this case because "actual
innocence means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." Bousley v. United

States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). Petitioner has not come forward with new reliable
evidence showing that he did not engage in the conduct that led to Scott Gold's death; he
instead makes the legal argument that the wrong court tried him for killing Gold. This
Court agrees with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected a similar argument:
Regardless of whether the constitutional errors claimed by [Petitioner] are
characterized as "procedural" or "jurisdictional" in nature, they do not
implicate the "concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of
an innocent person," Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325, that underlies "actual innocence"
tolling.

Casey v. Tennessee, 2010 WL 3681224 at *2 (6th Cir. 2010).
4. Conclusion
For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the Petition is not timely, and
Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal will be granted on that basis. The Court
does not reach Respondent's alternative argument that Petitioner's claims are
procedurally defaulted. 3

3

The Court expresses no opinion on whether a potential remedy may still exist for Petitioner in
the state courts. It concludes only that Petitioner has simply waited too long to seek relief in federal court.
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CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
As required by Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court
evaluates this case for suitability of a certificate of appealability ("COA''). See also 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c).
A habeas petitioner cannot appeal unless a COA has issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253. A
COA may issue only when the petitioner "has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This showing can be established by
demonstrating that "reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner" or that the issues were
"adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473,484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)).
The Court is satisfied that the issues in this case are unique and significant enough
that the petitioner should at least be given the opportunity to convince the Court of
Appeals of the merit of his arguments, despite the ruling of this Court. The Court will
therefore issue a COA over its decision that the Petition is untimely. Petitioner is advised
that he must still file a timely notice of appeal in this Court if he intends to pursue such an
appeal..

ORDER
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

Respondent's Motion for Summary Dismissal (Dkt. 17) is GRANTED.
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The Court issues a certificate of appealability over its decision that the
Petitioner did not comply with the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d). Upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal in this case, and not
until such time, the Clerk of Court shall forward the necessary paperwork
to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for the docketing of an appeal
in a civil case.

DATED: March 11, 2011

Honorable Ronald E. Bush
U. S. Magistrate Judge
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William Wolfe appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and § 2253, and we affirm.
Wolfe's federal habeas petition was due in April of 1997 under the one-year

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
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** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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"grace period" after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46
(9th Cir. 2001). He did not file this action until 2009. Wolfe argues that his petition
should be considered timely under the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable
tolling because the state withheld his legal materials from him until May of 1997. 1
We review de novo. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010).
Even assuming that withholding Wolfe's legal materials from him
constituted affirmative misconduct or an extraordinary circumstance beyond
Wolfe's control, the state's misconduct tolled the statute of limitations only as long
as that conduct endured. NLRB v. Don Burgess Constr. Corp., 596 F.2d 378, 383
(9th Cir. 1979) ("[F]raudulent concealment tolls a statute of limitations only for as
long as the concealment endures."); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,
419 (2005) ("Under long-established principles, petitioner's lack of diligence
precludes equity's operation.").
Wolfe also argues that the state engaged in continuing misconduct sufficient
to toll the statute for the entire period because prison employees told him at least
three times that the deadline for filing his petition had expired, without mentioning
the doctrines of equitable tolling or estoppel. However, the state cannot be faulted

1

In Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010), the Supreme Court
held that equitable tolling is available in AEDP A cases.
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for failing to inform Wolfe of the existence of legal arguments that hypothetically
could have helped him; the burden of due diligence was on Wolfe. When Wolfe
turned over his materials to a prison law clerk, it did not relieve him of his
"personal responsibility of complying with the law." Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d
1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

